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Taiwan’s Soft Power and Public 
Diplomacy
Gary D. RAWNSLEY 
Abstract: This paper analyses how Taiwan exercises “soft power” 
and uses public diplomacy to engage with the international communi-
ty, and to compensate for the absence of formal diplomatic relations 
with major powers. The research suggests that Taiwan’s strategies of 
international engagement are constrained by its external and internal 
political environments. The international system (structure) has lock-
ed Taiwan into a set of challenging arrangements over which it has 
little control or influence, while Taiwan’s public diplomacy architec-
ture and the activities organised and undertaken by its government 
agencies in Taibei and its representatives abroad (agency) reveal, at 
best, a misunderstanding of how Taiwan’s soft power might be exer-
cised more effectively. The strategic thematic choices of legitimacy 
(invoking Taiwan’s international status) versus credibility (which in 
soft power terms offers the most benefit), and the decision to privi-
lege cultural over political themes in international communications, 
all have profound effects on the success of Taiwan’s soft power.  
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Context
Do changes in ruling parties matter? The theme of this topical issue is 
appropriate for considering Taiwan’s soft power and public diplo-
macy, given that the strategic choices made by successive govern-
ments about what soft power means, the objectives of exercising soft 
power and engaging in public diplomacy (the communication process 
that helps realise soft power ambitions) and the themes to communi-
cate have all been decided by the political colour of whichever party 
resides in Taibei’s Presidential Palace. Research has shown that the 
domestic political environment plays a particularly influential role in 
determining Taiwan’s soft power strategies, and we could even go so 
far as to argue that democracy has been both a blessing and a curse. 
While the electoral system and the consolidation of democratic pro-
cedures can showcase Taiwan as the “first Chinese democracy” 
(Chao and Myers 1998) and challenge the theory of “Asian values”, 
the polarisation of parties and the volatility of electoral politics on the 
island restrains the communication to international audiences of 
more compelling themes and narratives.  
Taiwan has no formal diplomatic relations with major powers 
and does not enjoy membership of the principal international organi-
sations, which led Gerald Chan (1997: 37) to describe Taiwan as “fi-
nancially rich, but diplomatically poor”. Such difficult circumstances 
have convinced Taiwan’s governments, diplomats and foreign policy 
elites that a programme of strategic international communications 
may persuade audiences around the world to pay more attention to 
Taiwan, sympathise with their predicament, and support their polit-
ical agenda. To achieve this ambition, successive governments have 
decided on and communicated a distinct set of narratives that they 
think may appeal to international audiences that are largely unfamiliar 
with Taiwan.  
However, we must be mindful that a focus on political parties 
and government agencies presents only a partial picture. In fact, any 
soft power strategy benefits from distance from government in order 
to counter suspicions regarding motive, and is especially important in 
helping avoid the pejorative association of government communica-
tions with the (highly misunderstood) label “propaganda”. Taiwan 
has a rich public diplomacy environment that is expanding beyond 
government and embraces not only the cultural industries, but reli-
gious and humanitarian organisations, non-governmental organisa-
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tions (NGOs), student societies and other forms of activity extending 
from Taiwan’s civil society.  
Since the introduction of democratic institutions and processes 
in 1987, Taiwan’s international communications have shifted from a 
model based on a style of propaganda associated with authoritarian 
governments (rationalised by the prevailing Cold War context that 
structured the Taibei–Beijing relationship) to one of public and espe-
cially cultural diplomacy (Rawnsley 2000). When in power, both the 
Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang) and Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) have embraced the idea of soft power – defined as “the ability 
to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or pay-
ments” (Nye 2004: x) and as  
a form of national power that is based on ideational and cultural 
attractiveness, which is intentionally or unintentionally realized by 
actors in international relations to achieve strategic imperatives 
(Lee 2011: 11)  
– to help meet the international challenges Taiwan faces. This is a 
rational calculation: Given Taiwan’s liberal–democratic credentials, 
soft power should demonstrate the congruity of the political system’s 
values with those of the major Western powers and help offset au-
thoritarian China’s own “charm offensive” (Kurlantzick 2008). This is 
consistent with Joseph Nye’s observation that values, especially demo- 
cratic ones, are an important soft power asset:  
A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics be-
cause other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, 
aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it 
(Nye 2004: 4).  
As one American diplomat told political scientist Shelley Rigger, 
“Taiwan has grown into a society that represents most of our im-
portant values that we try to promote elsewhere in the world” (Rigger 
2011: 189). 
However, this demonstrates that we still depend far too much on 
Anglo-American approaches to soft power rather than adopting per-
spectives that are sensitive to local cultural understandings and polit-
ical practices. Hence the urgent need to engage in the “de-Western-
isation” of soft power and public diplomacy, which expands the dis-
cussion about these concepts beyond the dominant paradigms. As 
more and more governments are turning to soft power as a cost-ef-
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fective instrument of statecraft, we must appreciate the way in which 
meanings of power and soft power are embedded within, help shape 
and are shaped by distinct environments. In this way, de-Western-
isation attempts to provide a more culturally aware and nuanced  
understanding and explanation of the different theoretical and con-
ceptual perspectives we may encounter beyond Europe and North 
America. Taiwan exists within a particular set of internal and external 
(political, cultural and strategic) environments that shape its under-
standing of and approach to international communications and the 
exercise of soft power. It combines the democratic values of Western 
soft power theory with the projection of Chinese culture, as well as a 
powerful and attractive economy that was recognisable long before 
China embarked on its own remarkable process of modernisation 
(deLisle 2010). In Taiwan’s public diplomacy narrative, we find a 
distinctive blend of the traditional and modern that is particularly 
appealing to tourists from mainland China who are now able to visit 
the island and appreciate first-hand the similarities and differences on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
Structure
In order to appreciate the limits to Taiwan’s soft power capacity, we 
must address the “distinctive kind of environment” in which it is 
located (Lukes 2005: 485). This connects with Nye’s (2011) observa-
tion that states operate within “enabling and disabling” environments 
that are familiar to anyone with knowledge of Taiwan’s politics and 
political history. These environments are as follows: Taiwan’s posi-
tion in the triangular relationship with the US and China; the scarcity 
of official diplomatic relations with major powers and exclusion from 
the foremost international organisations (including the United Na-
tions); at home, a contested national identity; an international news 
environment that chooses to disregard Taiwan except when it is hit 
by an earthquake or threatened yet again by military intimidation 
from Beijing; and vigorous electoral competition between parties 
pursuing very different political and strategic agendas (which means 
foreign and China-related policies are subjects for political contesta-
tion, and each party must calculate the precise consequences of un-
popular decisions on electoral support). Accordingly, any discussion 
of Taiwan’s international activity (communicative or otherwise) must 
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acknowledge the electoral volatility and the clear polarisation of par-
ties that, in part, revolve around issues of identity and relations with 
the PRC. Moreover, interviews conducted in 2011 and 2013 with key 
actors in the government agencies responsible for Taiwan’s interna-
tional projection reveal apprehension about China’s likely reaction to 
specifically political themes, including questions of Taiwan’s status or 
identity. These anxieties do impose penalties on Taiwan’s public dip-
lomacy, for the understandable reluctance at all levels of government 
to confront the issue of identity impedes the design of communica-
tion strategies that might have international appeal, but would disturb 
domestic supporters or the authorities in Beijing. These consider-
ations also impact on Taiwan’s capacity to decide on, manufacture 
and sell a consistent brand image and profile. In short, Taiwan’s pub-
lic diplomacy is based on an ideological position, which is why 
changes in ruling parties matter. Ma Ying-jeou’s (Ma Yingjiu) admin-
istration overturned the more provocative style of government that 
characterised Chen Shui-bian’s (Chen Shuibian) presidency (and some 
may even say this provocative style began in the democratic era with 
Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui) and his insistence on “two states” when 
dealing with Beijing). Ma Ying-jeou has adopted a more conciliatory 
approach, and this has fed into the style and content of Taiwan’s 
international communication programme, which is formed around 
benign themes such as culture, rather than more appealing but also 
more incendiary themes such as democracy. 
The connection between the PRC’s claims on Taiwan and Tai-
wan’s public diplomacy is important because it raises issues of legiti-
macy, authority and credibility and how these concepts are addressed 
in communicated narratives. As Nye has noted:  
Not only do actors try to influence each other directly and indi-
rectly through soft power; they also compete to deprive each other 
of attractiveness and legitimacy, thus creating a disabling envir-
onment either in public opinion, and/or in the eyes of relevant 
third parties (Nye 2011: 99).  
The diplomatic competition between the PRC and Taiwan (which has 
abated since a diplomatic “truce” was declared after the KMT’s Ma 
Ying-jeou was elected president in 2008) has revolved around the 
question of legitimacy and trying to persuade third parties to support 
one side of the Taiwan Strait over the other. When Taiwan is com-
peting with the PRC for legitimacy, it finds itself in an unstable and 
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unpredictable position because it is trying to operate within a disab-
ling environment. This is because legitimacy is offered or denied by 
the diplomatic community for a number of reasons that are beyond 
Taiwan’s control or influence. It is largely a systemic issue that is 
determined outside Taibei. On the other hand, when the issue is cred-
ibility – the linchpin of any communicative act (Nye 2011: 101) – 
Taiwan, as a successful liberal democracy, has far more soft power 
capacity than the PRC. This is because credibility works within and 
helps shape an enabling environment, and the PRC is denied access 
to this environment because of the authoritarian nature of its political 
system. However, one could also argue that because Taiwan’s foreign 
policy has focused overwhelmingly on legitimacy which provokes 
such questions as: Which is the “real” China? Is Taiwan’s flag recog-
nised? Why isn’t Taiwan a member of the United Nations? Hence, 
the object itself becomes a hindrance to the further success and con-
tributes to the creation of a disabling environment.  
Agency
Environmental and structural considerations are only one explanation 
for the limited success of Taiwan’s soft power activities. Working 
within these environments, agents – both governmental and non-
governmental – must design and execute strategies that will compen-
sate for and ultimately overcome the problems imposed by the con-
figuration of the international system. However, this requires atten-
tion to a number of issues, including: Why do we need to exercise 
soft power? Who is responsible for planning and undertaking public 
diplomacy activities? Who is the target audience? What are the objec-
tives? How will we know when we have achieved them? My research, 
conducted in 2011 and 2013 through interviews with members of all 
the government agencies responsible for Taiwan’s international 
communications and outreach programmes, indicates that the gov-
ernment bureaucracy collectively misunderstands how soft power 
works and overlooks (for party political reasons) the strategies that 
might best project Taiwan. There is widespread acceptance that Tai-
wan must exercise soft power (however it is defined), but there is a 
fundamental lack of insight or consensus within government depart-
ments about why this must be done. The aims and objectives of Tai-
wan’s international outreach remain largely unstated and unknown 
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and, therefore, un-communicated. In the absence of any agreement 
on objectives, it is impossible to measure the impact of soft power 
programmes. How will you know when you have met your ambitions 
if you don’t know what you are trying to achieve? 
Such problems reflect the deficiencies in the bureaucratic archi-
tecture designed to facilitate Taiwan’s public diplomacy. The absence 
of a coherent strategy among the myriad and dispersed government 
agencies responsible for Taiwan’s international outreach prevents 
central coordination and the communication of consistent themes 
and messages. The need for a coordinating body has been discussed 
for some time, and almost all the interviewees for this paper conced-
ed that the lack of a single co-ordinating unit for Taiwan’s public 
diplomacy is a serious impediment to the success of their work. Des-
pite this, the government instead decided to dissolve the Government 
Information Office (GIO) and relocate its functions in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and a new Ministry of Culture. Interview-
ees in both the GIO and MoFA were aware of the problems facing 
American public diplomacy following the closure of the United States 
Information Agency (USIA. See Cull 2012) and they worried that 
Taiwan’s public diplomacy would face similar difficulties. Members of 
both agencies interviewed in 2011 and 2013 believed that the decision 
to move public diplomacy to MoFA was a mistake because each gov-
ernment agency had different perceptions of what can be achieved 
and how. MoFA’s commitment to traditional diplomatic practices sits 
uneasily with the urgent requirement for a more co-ordinated public 
diplomacy strategy. 
Moreover, changing structures and systems is not a panacea be-
cause the disabling environment continues to restrain Taiwan’s inter-
national outreach. Rather, the government and its bureaucracy must 
understand how to work better within the confines an international 
system they cannot change and create more “enabling” conditions. 
As Nye has observed: 
As a first step in any game, it helps to start by figuring out who is 
holding the high cards and how many chips each player has. 
Equally important, however, is that policymakers have the contex-
tual intelligence to understand what game they are playing. Which 
resources provide the best basis for power in a particular context? 
(Nye 2011: 9) 
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First, Taiwan must acknowledge that China holds the high cards: the 
PRC enjoys diplomatic relations with the major powers, international 
legitimacy and an enviable amount of media attention. By the same 
token, Taiwan has far more credibility than the PRC, and its demo-
cratic values are Taiwan’s greatest soft power asset. These are Tai-
wan’s most precious resources, and it is the responsibility of Taiwan’s 
over-cautious and rather conservative bureaucracy to use these re-
sources in the most effective way. However, the absence of frequent 
surveys of international public opinion about Taiwan and the re-
strained activities of its overseas representatives, together with the 
alarming deficiency in coverage of international news by the local 
media and the discouraging relationship between the public diploma-
cy machinery and foreign journalists stationed on the island (one of 
Taiwan’s most important soft power advantages), indicates the pre-
vailing indifferent attitude towards “contextual intelligence”. If one 
public diplomacy ambition is to persuade the world to listen to Tai-
wan, Taiwan must begin to listen to the world.  
Of course, a state-centric approach only reveals a partial story. In 
addition to understanding the public diplomacy architecture that is 
assembled within the government bureaucracy, it is necessary to con-
sider how actors beyond the state engage in soft power and “new” 
dialogic public diplomacy (Melissen 2007) to create an enabling envir-
onment. Detached from the government and standing apart from its 
political agenda, actors within civil society enjoy far more credibility 
and trust among audiences than agencies that act on behalf of the 
government. Public diplomacy from civil society and among NGOs 
can be considered a by-product of a nation’s soft power because their 
work reflects a democratic culture that encourages pluralism, diversity 
and charity. They are also largely immune from changes in ruling 
parties and their ideological positions. For this reason, Taiwan’s civil 
society offers soft power advantages over the PRC where the gov-
ernment manages the non-governmental sector, and therefore lacks 
the kind of credibility that would make it an agent of soft power. 
Moreover, the non-governmental sector is able to forge and sus-
tain meaningful long-term relationships with groups and individuals 
overseas. Taiwan’s Youth Ambassador Programme has developed 
close personal relationships between the participants and their peers 
in Taiwan’s diplomatic allies. This initiative was launched in 2009 by 
the Ma Government, but the programme and its participants remain 
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appropriately distant from government involvement: The state, as 
with most of the best public diplomacy that occurs in the non-gov-
ernmental sector, is a facilitator rather than accomplice. The pro-
gramme despatches teams of university students to those countries 
that still formally recognise Taiwan (22 countries at the time of writ-
ing) to meet and engage with young locals their own age. The partici-
pants in the programme do not consider their activities political, nor 
do they recognise the label “public diplomacy” to describe their mis-
sion. Instead, they see their travel as an opportunity to make new 
friends and share cultural experiences. Not only is their autonomy 
from any political involvement the programme’s principal asset, but 
they also help breach the most significant “last three feet” of direct 
person-to-person communication, where trust and credibility can be 
generated. 
Another example of this style of public diplomacy, one that en-
courages an inward traffic of visitors to the island, is the Say Taiwan! 
programme, which was designed and promoted in 2011 by the Coun-
cil of Cultural Affairs to coincide with the centenary of the founding 
of the Republic of China (ROC). The programme encouraged foreign 
visitors to live with local families and then narrate their experiences 
and impressions of Taiwan on social media sites. In this way, Say 
Taiwan! encouraged a relational and dialogical style of public diplo-
macy without imposing any particular political agenda on visitors. 
The participants were left alone to construct and relate their own 
meanings and interpretations of Taiwan in the confidence that their 
experience would be sufficiently positive.  
The non-governmental sector has also contributed to Taiwan’s 
soft power by offering humanitarian aid to areas overseas suffering 
from the consequences of natural disasters. This is public diplomacy 
of the deed, recognising that actions will always convey a far more 
convincing and compelling narrative than words. Particularly note-
worthy is the global outreach of the Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation 
(Yao 2012), while the generous assistance offered by Taiwan to Japan 
after the latter’s earthquake of March 2011 – amounting to 10 billion 
JPY – has been commemorated by a public of message of thanks 
from the Japanese people to “our Taiwanese friends” in the Taibei 
Fine Arts Museum. While Taiwan has a long history of providing 
humanitarian assistance and aid to developing nations, and engaging 
in rescue work in crisis-hit areas (Chan 1997; Rockower 2011: 122), 
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the activities of the non-governmental sector again add a level of 
credibility that a state-sponsored programme might never achieve. 
A Cultural Agenda
Under President Ma, the thematic priorities of Taiwan’s soft power 
push have changed. Between 2000 and 2008, when Chen Shui-bian 
and the DPP governed the island, Taiwan’s international outreach 
revolved around a strategic agenda that highlighted the historic 
achievement of democracy and the vibrancy of Taiwan’s political 
society. Just as the KMT defeated the DPP in the 2008 presidential 
election, Wang and Lu (2008) observed that “most Taiwanese […] 
emphasize democracy as being the most valuable soft power asset 
that Taiwan holds internationally”; and that “compared to China, 
proponents of soft power in Taiwan place less emphasis on tradition-
al culture in their arguments” (Wang and Lu 2008: 432). Since 2008, 
these remarks have been completely overturned. Even though Presi-
dent Ma pledged that “the most important asset” of Taiwan’s foreign 
policy “is our democracy, our way of life, our willingness to maintain 
cross-strait stability, and our determination to fulfil our obligations to 
the international community” (Taiwan Today 2008), after 2008 the 
government hastily decided to promote Taiwan as “the preserver of 
traditional Chinese culture” (which is how, in interviews, individuals 
and members of government agencies involved in public diplomacy 
referred to Taiwan’s identity), and that this would be the main aim of 
the island’s public diplomacy work. Part of the suggested strategy 
involved despatching exhibitions of traditional Chinese calligraphy 
around the world. However, while this reinforces the theme of Tai-
wan as the preserver of traditional culture, it is unlikely that the exhi-
bition would appeal to or have relevance among audiences that are 
not already familiar with Taiwan and its political history. Placing the 
exhibition in context would require juxtaposing the traditional and 
simplified characters, which would immediately politicise the issue. 
The actors responsible for Taiwan’s public diplomacy, inter-
viewed for this research in 2011 and 2013, agree that this change of 
narrative is easily explained. They say that culture is far less politically 
sensitive than the story of Taiwan’s democratisation, and this sensitiv-
ity is reflected in anxiety: first, about how the supporters of each 
party would acknowledge a distinctly political narrative; and second, 
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about how the mainland Chinese would tolerate themes that privi-
leged Taiwan’s democracy and democratisation. Given the strained 
relationship between Beijing and Taibei during the Chen Shui-bian 
era of government, it seems only fitting that the KMT administration 
after 2008 should choose to de-emphasise a “green” agenda and 
promote a less provocative “blue” narrative’. Moreover, the self-styled 
diplomatic “truce” that in 2010 paused the fierce competition be-
tween Taibei and Beijing for diplomatic allies in favour of closer eco-
nomic ties (via the signing of the Economic Co-operation Frame-
work Agreement, ECFA) and greater scope for traffic between the 
two sides (including direct flights and tourism), also dampened en-
thusiasm in Taiwan for the communication of political themes that 
might trouble the PRC. 
While the strategic reasons for privileging culture are reasonable, 
the agents responsible for Taiwan’s public diplomacy still need to 
address several interconnected concerns. The first relates to the diffi-
culty of measuring impacts as opposed to outputs. It is easy to count 
the number of international visitors who pass through Taiwan’s air-
ports or the box-office receipts for a movie that is made in Taiwan 
and shown at an international film festival. It is far more challenging 
to measure the response of individuals who encounter Taiwan in a 
cultural mode and determine whether their attitudes or behaviour 
towards Taiwan have changed as a consequence of engaging with a 
specific cultural product. After all, culture is highly subjective, and 
what may appeal to one member of the audience may not appeal in 
the same way, if at all, to another (Liebes and Katz 1993). In fact, 
there is a distinct possibility that the audience may reject the cultural 
product altogether as a threat to their own social values (as per “cul-
tural imperialism”; Lee 2011: 22). In other words, the audience may 
interpret the cultural product in an entirely different way from what 
was intended. This means that the outcomes of soft power strategies 
are “more in control of the subject than is often the case with hard 
power” (Nye 2008: xiii) and, therefore, there is no guarantee that 
cultural interest will translate into tangible soft power outcomes; 
there is no certified direct correlation between consuming a cultural 
product and a change in opinion or behaviour toward the source 
(McConnell 2008; Nakano 2008). This is particularly the case when 
cultural products are being exported around the world for viewing by 
audiences who may have no or very little cultural understanding of 
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what they are seeing. Hence, it is necessary to understand the audi-
ence for such outreach programmes; to determine with whom one 
wishes to communicate, why and how. 
One final consideration, which again relates to the colour of the 
ruling party, is the question of who has the power to define Taiwan’s 
culture that is communicated to the international community. Given 
the issues of identity that continue to inspire political decisions, dis-
courses and outcomes (Chinese, Taiwanese, New Taiwanese, indigen-
ous communities), whose cultural narrative dominates and why? As 
suggested above, the DPP administration tried to privilege the Tai-
wanese culture over the Han Chinese, while the KMT has reversed 
this position to focus on traditional Chinese culture. Which Taiwan is 
being represented in Taiwan’s international outreach? 
Conclusions 
This paper has briefly addressed some of the core issues connecting 
changes in Taiwan’s ruling parties and the government’s soft power 
strategies. The principal theme is that the colour of the party in power 
has influenced and determined the narrative that Taiwan’s public 
diplomacy narrates to the world. The KMT has chosen to represent 
Taiwan as the preserver of traditional Chinese culture and to refrain 
from referring to specifically political issues, such as Taiwan’s democ-
racy, which may disturb the delicate relationship with the PRC. Al-
though this decision is understandable, it is possible to conclude that 
these cultural themes have little soft power impact beyond the main-
land tourists who are visiting Taiwan in ever-greater numbers. As 
discussed above, cultural approaches have several inbuilt problems. 
Moreover, Taiwan’s political values are consistent with those of other 
liberal democracies and challenge both the PRC and the propaganda 
disseminated during Taiwan’s 40 years of authoritarian rule by the 
KMT. Perhaps a narrative highlighting Taiwan’s democratic achieve-
ments and the coincidence of its political values and culture with 
those of other liberal-democracies might secure more soft power pay-
offs.  
If we lean towards pessimism, we might conclude that the Tai-
wan case study highlights a fundamental flaw in the soft power thesis; 
namely, that international recognition is a precondition for successful 
soft power projection, and therefore recognition and legitimacy 
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trump the soft power capital of democratic values. Is soft power only 
really meaningful as a practical arrangement of statesmanship – a 
“luxury” (Layne 2010) – for governments who possess power in other 
areas? 
This would be a rather depressing conclusion that removes agen-
cy from the equation. In addition to considering the structural con-
straints, the discussion has also alluded to problems with the gov-
ernment’s public diplomacy system. My observations of Taiwan’s 
public diplomats indicate a worrying passivity, an acceptance of the 
“disabling environment” and the limitations it imposes on their activ-
ities. Perhaps the government – whichever party it represents – needs 
to be much clearer about the objectives of Taiwan’s soft power strat-
egy (“cultural influence” and “persuading people to know Taiwan”, 
two ambitions that several interviewees mentioned, are far too vague 
and beyond measurement), and to design a public diplomacy system 
that will allow for greater consistency, integration and, above all, 
much-needed co-ordination.  
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